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1. Introduction
A	 great	 deal	 of	 work	 in	 the	 contemporary	 personal	 identity	 de-
bate	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 following	 two	 theses	 are	
incompatible:

























paper	will	be	given	over	 to	defensive	and	diagnostic	 tasks,	 to	 rebut	
1.	 For	examples	of	adherence	to	(A)	motivating	rejection	of	(B),	see	Snowdon	
1990,	Ayers	1991,	Olson	1997,	Mackie	1999.	For	examples	of	adherence	to	(B)	
motivating	 rejection	of	 (A),	 see	 Shoemaker	 2008,	 Johnston	 2007,	Noonan	
2010,	Parfit	2012.
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objections,	 and	 to	 try	 to	make	 some	 sense	of	 the	prevalence	of	 the	
mistaken	assumption	that	the	theses	are	incompatible.2
Before	pressing	on	with	these	tasks	it	may	be	helpful	first	to	give	
















A	more	basic	 theoretical	challenge	 for	anyone	who	rejects	 (A)	 is	
to	give	an	alternative	account	of	our	fundamental	nature	that	can	be	
taken	seriously.	For	an	indication	of	the	difficulty	of	this	challenge,	it	
is	enough	simply	 to	state	 the	most	 recent	alternative	accounts	 from	
major	figures	who	have	 felt	 compelled	 to	 reject	 (A)	on	 the	basis	of	






























of	 objection.	 The	 first	 objection	 is	 that	 the	 compatibilist	 proposal	

















revealed	by	more	 theoretical	 reflection.	 It	 is	 theoretically	plausible	 that	an	
animate	organism	such	as	a	human	animal	would	persist	when	cut	down	to	
the	realizer	of	its	animate	capacities.	



















himself	 is	 the	original	animal,	an	 illusion	it	would	be	so	“immensely	
convenient	to	fall	in	with”	that	we	are	drawn	into	judging	(B).



























we	do	not	 take	 it	 that	 a	 toaster	 can	persist	mutilated	 right	down	 to	
a	power	cord.	One	 factor	 in	our	 judgments	 is	 this:	although	 the	un-
plugged	toaster	does	not	occurrently	toast	bread,	it	retains	the	capac-
ity	 for	 this	 activity	 characteristic	of	 its	kind.	 Its	 improbable	 intrinsic	
structure	and	organization	is	such	that	it	would	take	only	a	relatively	
simple	 external	 intervention	 (plugging-in)	 for	 that	 characteristic	 ac-




intervention	 cannot	 reasonably	be	 said	 to	be	a	mere	 trigger	 for	 the	


























asymmetric	 fission	 and	 fusion.	 The	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 animalist	
thesis	 (A)	 strongly	 supports	 the	 intuitive	 “Brown-Brownson”	verdict	
(B2),	as	well	as	the	intuitive	remnant	verdict	(B1).
2. The Nature and Persistence of Macroscopic Continuants
Our	initial	fix	on	macroscopic	continuants,	such	as	boulders,	cats,	and	
trees,	is	their	immediate	engagement	of	our	perceptual	systems.	Fur-
ther	 experience	 reveals	 that	 the	 activities	 of	 these	 entities	 figure	 in	




What	 about	 the	 persistence	 through	 time	 of	 a	macroscopic	 con-
tinuant?	In	the	light	of	the	general	conception	of	its	nature	as	a	locus	
7.	 Wiggins	2001	is	an	extended	elaboration	of	this	broadly	Aristotelian	picture.




The	 “dominant	 path”	 clause	 is	 intended	 to	 handle	 fission	 cases	
in	a	 familiar	way.	But	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	 there	 is	no	assumption	
that	a	single	dominant	path	of	preservation	of	kind-characteristic	ca-
pacities	must	 exclude	 spatiotemporal	 forking	 or	 other	 scattering	 of	
matter.	That	will	depend	upon	 the	kinds	and	capacities	 in	question.	
For	example,	a	watch	can	persist	disassembled	 into	components	 for	





particles,	 then	all	such	 intrinsic	organization	would	be	 lost,	and	the	
complex	external	intervention	on	the	plurality	required	to	bring	about	
time-keeping	activity	could	not	exploit	any	abiding	structure.	So	it	is	
plausible	 that	 the	 kind-characteristic	 capacity	would	 not	 have	 been	




other	kinds	of	 continuant.	For	example,	 the	characteristic	 capacities	






















macroscopic	 activities	must	 be	 somehow	 superficial	 or	manifest,	 in	








acteristic	 of	 that	 kind.	 So	 the	default	 presumption	 about	 any	 single	
one	of	its	capacities	should	be	that	its	preservation	is	not	individually	
metaphysically	necessary	for	the	persistence	of	the	entity.	The	entity	







ifiable	 facts	about	 the	number	of	 characteristic	 capacities	preserved.	
A	 realistic	epistemology	will	 recognize	 reciprocal	evidential	 support	
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for	sensitivity	and	motility	which	characterize	every	zoological	organ-
ism.8	Human	animals	are	peerless	 in	 their	sensitivity	 to	abstract	pat-






skeleton’	of	 any	organism	 that	has	 to	 adjust	 its	 activities	 to	what	 is	
going	on	around	it”.9	An	animal	is	an	organism	with	a	pressing	need	to	
adjust	its	activities	to	what	is	going	on	around	it;	unlike	a	plant,	it	must	
seek	out	organic	matter	 in	order	 to	 regulate	 its	nutrient	and	energy	
levels.	Animals’	sensorimotor	means	to	maintenance	of	their	nutrition	
and	metabolism	 is	 a	 particular	 exemplification	of	 the	 generally	 self-
regulating	or	“homeostatic”	nature	of	all	living	organisms.
Developing	(A)	in	this	way,	we	see	that	a	theoretical	role	for	psy-
chology	 in	 our	 persistence	 need	 not	 derive	 from	 a	metaphysical	 fe-
tishization	 of	 the	 “personal”	 capacities	 for	moral	 responsibility,	 self-
reflection,	and	so	on,	which	distinguish	us	from	other	animals.	If	(A)	







distinction	between	 “biological”	 and	 “psychological”	 capacities	 is	 an	
exclusive	one.	However,	the	sensorimotor	capacities	characteristic	of	
8.	 Marine	sponges	are	sometimes	considered	to	be	an	exception,	having	man-




















to	be	 said	about	 the	activities	 characteristic	of	human	animals.	The	
variety	is	enormous,	but	we	can	begin	a	list:
Breathing,	sleeping,	snoring,	pointing,	listening,	walking,	




ing,	 hunting,	 relaxing,	 visually	 attending,	 problem-solv-
ing,	blocking	light,	resisting	penetration,	sweating,	paint-
ing,	singing,	story-telling,	fidgeting,	digesting…




















There	 is	something	to	 this	objection,	but	 its	 force	should	not	be	
exaggerated	 in	 the	present	 context.	The	 remnant	 cerebrum	case	 in	
philosophical	 discussion	 is	 intended	 to	 lie	 at	 a	 certain	 conceptual	






At	 the	other	end	of	 the	spectrum	are	cases	of	 the	 following	sort:	
flesh	 is	 cut	away	 from	a	human	organism	until	nothing	 is	 left	but	a	
small	patch	of	living	tissue	from	the	visual	cortex.	It	is	implausible	to	
suppose	 that	 the	human	organism	survives	 the	 latter	process.	Why?	
There	is	nothing	remaining	in	that	situation	with	a	range	of	capacities	
for	activity	characteristic	of	a	whole	human	organism.	In	order	to	bring	




























tremely	plausible.	 In	 this	situation	a	very	 large	number	of	character-





organism	 capacities	 controlled	 lower	 in	 the	 central	 nervous	 system,	
such	as	breathing	or	excreting.
The	 objector’s	 single	 term	 ‘thinking’	 grossly	 underestimates	 the	
number	 and	 diversity	 of	 human-organism-characteristic	 capacities	
	 Rory	Madden Human Persistence
philosophers’	imprint	 –		8		–	 vol.	16,	no.	17	(september	2016)



















The	crucial	disanalogy	 is	 this:	a	 “kidney	 in	a	vat”,	 even	 if	 careful-
ly	stimulated	to	intrinsic	activity	matching	its	 intrinsic	activity	when	
contained	within	a	 larger	organism,	 is	not	 thereby	sufficient	 for	 the	









11.	 This	 is	 a	 common	animalist	 claim.	See	Snowdon	1990:	98,	Snowdon	1991:	
112–113,	Olson	1997:	18,	and	Olson	2007:	42.
technically	sophisticated	life-support	and	stimulation	in	order	to	trig-








scious	 activity	 includes	 traffic	 between	 the	 cerebrum	 and	 sub-corti-
cal	 structures	 such	 as	 the	 thalamus.10	 If	 so,	 then	 perhaps	 (Sufficien-
cy)	 should	be	 replaced	by	 a	 variant	 claim,	mentioning	a	 larger	part	
of	the	central	nervous	system	than	the	cerebrum.	This	variant	claim	
could	 not	 be	 used	 in	 combination	 with	 (A-Persistence)	 to	 soundly	
infer	 (B1).	Would	 that	undermine	 the	present	argument?	No.	 (B1)	 is	
found	widely	intuitive	not	because	many	philosophers	have	detailed	


































would	be	me,	 these	people	would	be	 claiming	 that	 the	
true	criterion	of	identity	for	developed	human	animals	is	
of	this	Lockean	psychological	kind.	(2012:	12)
It	 is	certainly	 true	 that	Olson’s	well-known	entry	 to	 the	debate	 took	






acteristic	 of	 organisms	of	 our	 kind,	 and	 every	 animal	 kind,	 and	 are	
thus	not	irrelevant	to	our	persistence.
So	is	Parfit	right	to	say	animalism	developed	in	this	way	is	claim-
ing	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 identity	 for	 developed	 human	 animals	 is	 a	
brain-based	Lockean	criterion?	Parfit	 is	not	right	 to	say	this.	A	Lock-















and	 appearance	 is	 no	 overriding	 obstacle	 to	 its	 persistence,	 being	







not	be	 reduced	 to	 the	 size	of	 a	 small	 oblong	 chunk	of	marble	 con-
tained	within	 its	head,	neither,	 it	will	be	 imagined,	 could	a	human	
organism	be	reduced	to	the	size	of	its	cerebrum.	But	this	imagery	fails	
to	acknowledge	that	 the	realization	of	kind-characteristic	capacities	
of	 a	human	organism	 is	not	distributed	 like	 that	 of	 a	homogenous	
material	concretion.
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What it takes for us to persist through time is what I have 
called biological continuity: one survives just in case one’s 
purely animal functions — metabolism, the capacity to 
breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like — continue. 
I would put biology in place of psychology, and one’s bio-
logical life in place of one’s mind, in determining what it 


































between	 animalism	 and	 Lockeanism	 stands	 up	 even	 when	 animal-
ism	is	developed	in	a	way	that	supports	the	intuitive	verdict	about	the	
transplant	case.
This	 clarification	 invites	 two	 more	 substantial	 questions.	 First:	




involves	 an	 interval	 of	 pure	 information-transmission	between	dissolution	
of	terrestrial	matter	and	organization	of	Martian	matter	cannot	be	a	case	in	
which	 relevant	 capacities	 are	 continuously	 preserved.	 During	 the	 interval	
there	is	nothing	with	human-animal-characteristic	capacities.
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cally	necessary	 for	 the	persistence	of	a	human	organism.	 If	 sufficient	





So	 why	 does	 Olson	 elevate	 broadly	 autonomic	 capacities	—	for	
breathing,	 blood-circulation,	 etc.	—	into	 a	 metaphysically	 necessary	
position	over	sensorimotor	and	other	psychological	capacities	of	hu-
man	organisms?







has	 been	misinterpreted	 as	 supporting	 the	 claim	 that	 psychological	
capacities	 are	 completely	 irrelevant	 to	human	organism	persistence.	








Organisms	 differ	 from	 other	material	 things	 by	 having	
lives.	 By	 a	 life	 I	 mean	more	 or	 less	 what	 Locke	meant	



















metabolic	 storm	during	 the	 freeze.	 But	 it	 is	 implausible	 to	 suppose	
that	 there	 is	no	organism	during	 the	 freeze.	The	natural,	and	better,	
way	 to	 think	about	 the	case	 is	 that	 the	preservation	of	a	 sufficiency	
of	 cat-characteristic	 capacities	 is	 realized	 during	 the	 freeze	—	not	 in	
the	usual	way,	by	the	continuation	of	a	metabolic	storm,	but	instead	
by	 thermodynamic	 stasis.	What	matters	 for	 persistence	 is	 that	 suffi-
cient	 kind-characteristic	 capacities	 for	 whole-organism	 activity	 are	
preserved.	The	specific	underlying	thermo-chemical	realization	of	this	
preservation	may	vary	from	case	to	case.
Unger’s	 (1980)	Problem	of	 the	Many	 is	another	well-known	diffi-
culty	for	any	attempt	to	characterize	a	macroscopic	continuant	“from	

























As	we	have	 seen,	 the	 “macroscopic”	 conception	has	 the	 contrary	
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symbionts	—	such	as	bacteria	 in	 the	gut	 that	cannot	 survive	without	
their	hosts	—	demonstrate	the	general	risk	of	betting	on	any	such	sin-
gle	essence	of	life.17





















potential	 to	a	 state	of	 low	gravitational	potential.	So	 the	capacity	 to	
keep	balanced	has	a	causally	central	role	for	an	entity	of	this	kind.	If	
17.	 For	example,	studies	show	that	parasites	of	genus	Mycoplasma depend	upon	
their	 hosts	 for	 amino-acid	 and	 co-factor	 biosynthesis,	 and	 fatty-acid	 me-
tabolism.	See	Dupré	and	O’Malley	2009	for	references	to	relevant	empirical	
studies.
18.	 A	 few	 characteristic	 brute	material	 capacities	may	 be	 preserved	 for	 rather	




















In	response	 to	 these	general	problems	 for	a	micro-collective	con-
ception	 of	 the	 fundamental	 nature	 of	 a	 macroscopic	 continuant,	 it	
might	be	pointed	out	that	the	thesis	that	the	capacity	for	self-mainte-
nance	is	necessary	for	human	organism	persistence	is	logically	detach-
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(B1)	We	would	go	with	the	cerebrum	in	a	remnant	case.
(B2)	We	 would	 go	 with	 the	 cerebrum	 in	 a	 separation-and-at-
tachment	case.










It	 is,	on	the	 face	of	 it,	much	harder	 to	see	how	(A)	could	be	con-
sistent	with	 the	 intuitive	 verdict	 (B2)	 that	 one	of	 us	would	 go	with	
the	 cerebrum	 in	 the	 separation-and-attachment	 case.	 First	 consider	
the	separation	phase.	If	(A)	we	are	human	organisms,	and	(B2)	we	go	
with	the	cerebrum,	then	what	about	the	human	organism	that	is	left	













would	 appear	 to	 be	 only	 a	 single	 human	organism	present,	with	 a	
new	organ.	On	the	other	hand,	if	we	say	that	the	recipient	organism	








may	be	preserved	for	a	brief	 time,	compensating	for	the	 loss	of	 the	
specific	capacity	 to	maintain	balance.	A	rapid	 targeted	 intervention	
could	save	the	entity.	It	could,	as	seems	plausible,	be	caught	on	the	
way	down.
The	situation	 is	exactly	parallel	 for	a	human	organism	 that	 loses	
its	capacity	for	metabolic	self-maintenance.	With	some	very	quick	ex-
ternal	 intervention,	 it	 could	 in	 principle	 be	 caught	 on	 its	 plunge	 to	
thermodynamic	annihilation.	This	is	what	happens	to	the	remnant	ce-
rebrum	in	a	vat.	In	this	situation,	external	intervention	saves	it	from	




physically	 fetishizing	 the	 autonomic	 self-regulatory	 capacities	 real-
ized	lower	in	the	nervous	system	over	and	above	the	richer	capacities	




























organism	away	from	the	cerebrum,	one	 in	effect	 takes	a	 large	 living	
cutting	 from	 the	 parent	 organism,	 a	 parent	 organism	which	 is	 now	






But	 still,	 one	 might	 be	 puzzled.	 It	 has	 been	 agreed	—	plausibly	







































proposal	 to	 combine	 the	 animalist	 claim	 that	 we	 are	 fundamentally	 hu-
man	animals	with	the	claim	that	human	animals	have	Lockean	persistence	
conditions.




















So,	 far	 from	 creating	 trouble	 for	 animalism,	 the	 intuitive	 Brown-
Brownson	verdict	(B2)	is	in	fact	strongly	supported	by	the	thesis	that	
we	are	 fundamentally	human	organisms:	 it	 is	 theoretically	plausible	
that	a	human	organism	would	indeed	“go	with	the	cerebrum”	in	the	
separation-and-attachment	 case.	 First,	 a	 large	 living	 cutting	 is	 taken	
from	 the	human	organism.	Second,	 the	original,	now	much	 smaller,	
human	organism	has	a	large	inferior	organism	grafted	onto	it.
8. Conclusion




























What	 about	 the	 attachment	phase	of	 the	Brown-Brownson	 case?	
The	 attachment	 phase	 is	 also	 modeled	 by	 actual	 horticultural	 tech-
niques.	 It	 is	metaphysically	 no	 different	 from	 certain	 cases	 of	 plant 
20.	For	simplicity,	this	discussion	of	fission	ignores	the	nice	question	of	whether	
the	fission	of	paths	of	 kind-characteristic	 activity	must	happen	 immediately 
upon	spatial	 separation	of	 cerebrum	and	 “cerebrum-complement”.	As	with	
the	disassembled	watch,	one	might	 think	 that	 the	 improbable	matching	of	
the	 just-separated	 parts	 suffices	 for	 a	 single,	 but	 spatially	 forked,	 path	 of	
preserved	human	organism	capacities.	Consider	 the	unlikely	capacities	 for	
immunological	co-operation	between	the	two	parts.	Consider	the	many	ca-
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The	 second	 plausible	 principle	 is	 this:	 verdicts	 about	 the	 persis-
tence	of	Ks	 in	particular	cases	provide	evidential	 support	 for	claims	
about	 which	 capacities	 can	 be	 sufficient,	 or	 dominant,	 for	K-persis-




entitled	 to	 regard	 the	 familiar,	 strongly	 intuitive,	 verdicts	 about	our	
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What	 exactly,	 it	might	 be	 asked,	 justifies	 its	 key	 claims,	 that	 the	










But,	at	 this	final	 stage	of	proceedings,	 the	possibility	of	a	 supple-
mentary	response	becomes	visible.	This	paper	has	not	assumed	the	
animalist	thesis	(A).	It	has	only	argued	that	(A)	strongly	supports	the	
intuitive	verdicts	about	our	persistence	usually	 thought	 to	be	 incon-
sistent	with	that	thesis.	But	anyone	who	believes	the	independently	
attractive	thesis	that	we	are	fundamentally	biological	organisms	of	a	
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